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ABBREVIATIONS
The following abbreviations have been used in this brief:
Divorce Case

The divorce action assigned to the Honorable
Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. bearing civil no. 024901659
DA

Fraud Case

The action brought for fraud and unjust enrichment
assigned to the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. and
bearing civil no. 030902885.

James

James Lewis Kimball, the Petitioner below in the
divorce case, the Defendant in the fraud case, and
the Appellant in these proceedings.

Merae

Merae Kimball, the Respondent below in the
divorce case, the Plaintiff in the fraud case, and the
Appellee and Cross Appellant in these proceedings.

URCivP

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Tr

Transcript of divorce trial testimony.

Ex

Divorce trial exhibit.

R

Divorce trial court pleadings.

FTr

Transcript of fraud testimony.

FEx

Fraud trial exhibit.

Fr

Trial court pleadings in fraud case

Ruling Hearing

Transcript of the ruling hearing held on May 24th,
2005.

1005 Shares

1005 shares of preferred stock of Utah Bearing and
Fabrication Company, a Utah corporation, received

viii

by Merae from her father, Franklin Pardoe, the
founder of the company.
Fidelity Account

An investment account with Fidelity Investment
Company, opened by Merae in February of 1996.

Jay Rice Account

A joint investment account with American
Investment opened by the parties and funded by
Merae from her Fidelity Account.

Lori Kay Home

A home and real property located in Holladay,
Utah, purchased in September of 1997 and sold in
October of 1998.

Odd Piece of Lori Kay Property

An unimproved parcel of land, located at Holladay,
Utah and jointly held by James and Merae at the
time of trial.

Replacement Suburban

The 1997 Chevrolet Suburban purchases from Larry
H. Miller Chrysler Jeep, to replace the Suburban
destroyed in an accident.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann: 78-2a-3 (2)(h)(Supp. 2001)
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
AND RULES
The trial court action was tried upon the facts, without a jury, and as required by Rule 52
(a) of the U R Civ P, the trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an amended
decree of divorce.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON CROSS APPEAL, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND
PRESERVATION AT TRIAL COURT
The issues raised in Merae's cross-appeal are as follows:
L Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the finding that the money
received by James from forging and altering Merae's checks was used for family purposes
benefitting all members of the family, including James?
2. Did the trial court err in denying Merae's Rule 59 (b) motion to amend the findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and amended decree of divorce a) to find that James used the $142,647
he obtained by forging and altering Merae's checks for non-family purposes and b) to grant
judgment in the amount of $142,647 in Merae's favor and against James?
3. Did the trial court err in finding that Merae should be held in contempt of court for
violating court orders?
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Standard of Review: The standard of review applicable to the three issues stated above is
the Clearly Erroneous Standard. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is against the clear
weight of the evidence. See Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P. 2d 472, 476 (Utah App. 1991). As
to the contempt issue, see Von Hake v. Thomas 759 P. 2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988).
Issue preservation in trial court: The issues stated above were preserved in the trial court
by Merae's motion to amend findings of fact and conclusions of law, and amended decree of
divorce, see R 3751.
4. Did the trial court err in deciding not to award sanction against James' counsel under
Rule 11 (b) (3) of the U R Civ P?
Standard of Review: The standard of review applicable to this issue is the Correction of
Error Standard. Whether specific conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 11 is a question of law,
therefore, an appellate court reviews the trial court's determination that a violation has occurred,
for correctness. See Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P. 2d 709, 711 (Utah App. 1992).
Issue preservation in trial court: The issue stated above was preserved in the trial court by
Merae's motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the U R Civ P, see R 3820.
STATEMENT OF THE CONSOLIDATED CASES
The subjects of this consolidated appeal are two bench trials presided over by the
Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. The first, a divorce lawsuit, the "divorce case" herein, was
brought by James Lewis Kimball, "James" herein, against his wife, Merae Kimball, "Merae"
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herein. James appealed. The second case was brought by Merae, against James for fraud and
unjust enrichment, the "fraud case" herein. James appealed.
The divorce case involved custody of the parties' four children and money. The custody
issue was resolved prior to the trial by a stipulation of the parties that was approved by the trial
court and reduced to an order, see R 3526.
The fourteen day bench trial that followed was about the money remaining in Merae's
Fidelity Account when the parties separate in February of 2002. While there were ancillary
issues, the primary claim made by James was that the Fidelity Account money was a marital asset
because it did not result from a gift, nor was it inheritance, and if it was inheritance, it was comingled. James also made a claim for his attorney's fees.
Merae claimed that the Fidelity Account money was a result of her sale of the 1005
Shares she received from her father, and that it was never her intent to make those funds a part of
the marital estate. She also claimed that she is entitled to a judgment against James for $160,467
because he altered and forged her name on her Fidelity Account checks. Under crossexamination, James admitted to altering and forging Merae's Fidelity Account checks but
claimed he was entitled to do so because he and Merae were married, and that he used the money
he obtained through altering and forging Merae's checks for family purposes.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court ruled 1) that the 1005 Shares were Merae's
inheritance, 2) that the funds in Merae's Fidelity Account at the time the parties separated were
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not part of the marital estate, 3) that James had, without authorization, forged and altered
Merae's Fidelity Account checks and used the money for family purposes. The court did not
award James attorney fees because James did not prevail on the main issue of the case and
because the fees were unreasonable and unnecessary.
James filed an appeal challenging the trial court's findings, claiming, among other things,
that the findings of fact should not have been signed because they do not correspond with the
findings and rulings of the trial court.
In response, Merae filed a cross-appeal claiming, among other things, that she is entitled
to a judgment against James for $142,467 representing the money he took from altering and
forging her checks.
The fraud case was brought by Merae against her banks under §70A-4-401 Utah Code
Ann. (Supp. 1993), because they processed and paid checks on her Fidelity Account that had
been altered and forged, and against James for fraud and unjust enrichment, because he altered
and forged checks on her Fidelity Account and took the money.
Merae's claims against her banks were dismissed pursuant to pretrial motions because the
statute of limitations had run and her claim against James for fraud was dismissed at trial.
However, after hearing the evidence, the trial court ruled that 1] James, without the consent or
knowledge of Merae and without any right so to do, took Merae's money by either altering check
amounts or drawing checks with James or "Cash" as the payee, by forging the signature of
4

Merae 2] James was injustly enriched in that he took money to which he was not entitled 3]
James' actions constitute theft and forgery and he deceived Merae into believing he was working
4] Merae relegated administration of the family finances and investments to James and she did
not participate in their day-to-day management 5] James took improper advantage of his
managerial position and Merae's minimal participation and oversight 6] At least for the altered
checks and those made payable to James or "Cash", the proceeds were not used to financially
support James' family 7] These are the circumstances and the "misleading acts" that would make
it inequitable for James to retain the proceeds 8] It is reasonable that Merae be awarded a
judgment against James in the sum of $56,800 together with pre-judgment interest on each check
from the date thereon, if the date is visible, to the date ofjudgment and, thereafter, at the legal
rate.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
James has apparently either misunderstood or ignored his duty, as a matter of law and as
the appellant in these consolidated cases, to marshal the evidence. "The appealing party has the
burden of marshaling the evidence in support of the verdict [ruling] and then showing that it is
insufficient." Fitz v. Svnthes (TJSAI 990 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1999). In his Brief, rather than
meeting his burden of marshaling the evidence, James selectively presented as "facts" those
portions of testimony that are most favorable to his argument on appeal while, at the same time,
omitted critical evidence supporting the trial court's findings. Thus, James has failed in his duty
5

to marshal (as is discussed further below). As a consequence, Merae has identified below certain
critical facts (with citations to the Record) that support the trial court's findings. While not
exhaustive as to James' appeal (since Merae does not have the marshaling burden in that
respect), the facts presented below were adduced at trial and lend support to the trial court's
findings, but were otherwise ignored by James in his recitation of selective material facts.
As to the cross-appeal, the marshaling requirement is a little different. In that respect, the
trial court 1) denied Merae's Rule 59 (b) motion and ruled that there was sufficient evidence
presented at trial to support a finding that James used the proceeds he obtained by forging and
altering Merae's checks for family purposes, 2) denied her demand for a judgment in the amount
of $160,467 against James, 3) ruled that Merae was in contempt of court for violating court
orders relative to visitation, and 4) denied Merae's motion for sanctions against James' counsel
under Rule 11 (b)(3) of the U R Civ P.
The evidence presented at trial relative to the finding that James used, for family
purposes, the proceeds he obtained by forging and altering Merae's checks, is:
1. On February 26th, 1996, Merae opened the Fidelity Account, see Page 2 of Ex R 9,10,
15,16,17, and 18.
2. Merae's Fidelity Account was an "individual account", not a joint account with James,
see Ex R 12.
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3. James testified that the Fidelity Account was opened to hold monies from the sale of
the 1005 Shares, see Tr 890 L 11-12.
4. James knew that the Fidelity Account was Merae's individual account, see Tr 1283 L
10-25.
5. Merae claims that she never gave James the authority to sign her name on Fidelity
Account checks, see Tr 1510 L 1-3.
6. James claims that he had "trading privileges" on the Fidelity Account, see Tr 892 L 1,
but produced no documentation to support his claim, see Tr 892 L 22-25, Tr 893 L 5.
7. James claimed that he could sign his own name on Fidelity Account checks, see Tr 897
L 2-4, Tr 1313 L 24, and Tr 1314 L 1-3, hut produced no documentation to support his claim.
8. James never signed his name to a Fidelity Account check but forged Merae's name on
several Fidelity Account checks, see Ex R 13,14 and P 1933,1934, 1935,1937,1939,1940,
1941 and 1942 and FEx P 1-42.
9. Between June of 1999, and August of 2000, Merae gave James six $1,000 checks on
her Fidelity Account, that she had signed and made payable to James, see Ex R 13.
10. On December 8th, 2004, James stated, under oath, when asked if he altered Ex PI936,
"Ummm, one of us did," see Tr 923 L 21-25.
11. On December 15th, 2004, during the divorce trial, James admitted, under oath, that he
altered Ex P 1936 and other checks given to him by Merae, by changing the arabic number " 1 " to
a "4", and writing an "F" in front of the "One" and cashing them, see Tr 1277 L 13-16.
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12. Between June of 1998 and December of 2001, James forged Merae's signature on her
Fidelity Account checks, and deposited or cashed them, see Ex R 14.
13. The total amount of funds received by James, from altering and forging Fidelity
Account checks, was $142,467, see Ex R 13 and Ex R 14.
14. None of the checks had notations on them, describing the reason the check was
written or issued, see Ex R 13 and Ex R 14.
15. James testified that the funds he received from forging and altering checks in the
Fidelity Account, were used for "maintenance of our home, recreation, food, clothing, medical
needs, and other costs associated with running our household", see Tr 951 L 7-10, Tr 952 L 2224, Tr 957 L 17-21, Tr 959 L 1-2, Tr 960 L 16-18, Tr 962 L 25, and Tr 963 L 1-2.
16. James did not present receipts, invoices, or other documents showing how he utilized
the $142,467.
17. James did not tell Merae what he did with the $142,467, see Tr 1512 L 1-4.
18. James claimed that he had authority to sign Merae's name on her Fidelity Account
checks, because "We were a couple, we were married, we were a unit, I don't know". See Tr
1316 L 16.
The evidence presented at trial, relative to the finding that Merae was in contempt of
court for violating court orders relative to visitation, is:
1. Commissioner Bradford certified the issue of Merae's contempt relative to visitation,
on one occasion prior to the date that the parties reached a stipulation that settled all disputes
8

between them relative to child custody, parent-time, and related matters, see recommendation
dated 9/15/03.
2. On November 29th, 2004, the parties entered into a stipulation and agreement relative
to custody of the minor children, parent-time, and related matters, and their agreement was
memorialized by the trial court's order dated March 10th, 2005, see R 3526.
3. At paragraph 12 of the order, it is stated that all matters related to custody of the minor
children and related matters were settled, and that the only issues reserved for trial were:
A. The issue of the costs of Special Master are reserved, if no settlement of the
same.
B. The issue of costs concerning the custody evaluator, court-appointed
evaluation, including the costs for any and all experts from both parties
concerning the custody portion of this matter are hereby reserved.
C. The issue of child support is reserved, if no settlement of the same.
The evidence set forth in the trial court record, relative to the court's order by minute
entry, dated February 21 st , 2006, R 4063, stating that James' counsel did not mislead the court, is
as follows:
1. Ex R 6 was filled out by James, see Tr 1278 L 15-21.
2. The document was signed by James, on December 29th, 2000, see Tr 1278 L 25 and Tr
1279 L 1-2.
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3. Testimony given by David Ingles, a representative of the Larry H. Miller Group, was
to the effect that Ex R 6 was completed by James and submitted to the Larry H. Miller Group and
Zions Bank in connection with his request for a loan to purchase a 1997 Chevrolet Suburban, see
Tr 1387 L 15-22 and Tr 1388 L 5-12. (This was the Replacement Suburban.)
4. The last line of the "Applicant" section of Ex R 6, states that James' trade or
occupation is "sales" and his gross monthly income is "$60,000."
5. Section VIE "Credit Application", at page 13-14 of the memorandum signed by
Wendy J. Lems, attorney for James, on November 10th, 2005, R 3842-3, states that "At time of
trial, the Petitioner testified that the "per month" reference on his credit application meant "per
year" and such was a mere inadvertence."
6. A thorough review of the trial transcript of the testimony of James shows that the
statement of James set forth in Ms. Lems November 10th, 2005 memorandum does not exist.
7. The only testimony given by James, at the trial concerning his income, was that
between 1989 and 1993, the household brought in $60,000 plus on an average year, see Tr 718
LI.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
James, who is the Appellant in both appeals, has failed to marshal all the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings in both the divorce case and the fraud case and then
demonstrate that, despite such marshaled evidence, the findings are against the clear weight of
the evidence. Instead, he has selectively presented and skewed evidence to support his arguments
10

on appeal in effect rearguing the merits of his case before this appellate court. There was
insufficient evidence presented at trial to show that James used the money he received from
forging and altering Merae's checks for family purposes. Therefore, the ruling of the trial court
on this point should be reversed and Merae should be awarded a $142,467 judgment against
James.
In the parties' settlement of the custody issues, the questions of Merae's contempt were
not reserved for trial, therefore, they should not have been considered and ruled upon by the trial
court.
Evidence presented to the trial court by Merae's motion under Rule 11 U R Civ P clearly
shows that James' counsel intentionally misrepresented a material fact to mislead the trial court
and should have been sanctioned.
James has also failed to marshal all of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings in
the fraud case.
ARGUMENT
L

JAMES HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF MARSHALING THE
EVIDENCE.
In challenging the rulings of the trial court and the rulings' associated factual findings in

the two cases consolidated on appeal, James must proceed in two steps. First, he must marshal all
the evidence that supports the rulings. Second, he must then demonstrate that, despite the
marshaled evidence, the rulings and associated findings are so lacking in support as to be
11

"against the clear weight of the evidence" and, thus, clearly erroneous. See Doelle v. Bradley,
784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); see also Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.
2d 467,470 (Utah 1989).
Furthermore, James has a high standard to meet in marshaling the evidence. "In order to
properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which
supports the very findings the appellant resists." Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander &
Smith Assocs^ 881 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah App. 1994) (emphasis in original, quoting West Valley
City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991)). "Once appellants have
established every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they then 'must ferret out fatal flaw
in the evidence' and show why those pillars fail to support the trial court's findings."
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App.
1994), quoting West Valley, 818 P.2d at 1314. An appellant fails to meet his burden of
marshaling where he ignores evidence supportive of a jury's verdict [or rulings of the trial court]
and associated findings, and instead selectively marshals only evidence supportive of his
position, since to do so is tantamount to improperly rearguing the merits of his case before the
appellate court. Interiors Contracting, supra and Oneida, supra. Therefore, when an appellant
fails to adequately marshal the evidence for the reviewing appellate court, that court should
"refuse to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid."
Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neale, 783 P 2.d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989)
12

James' appeal questions whether the trial court abused its discretion on several issues.
Ergo, James must successfully challenge the factual findings upon which the trial court's
decision depended.
When parties appeal a court's fact-sensitive use of its discretionary
powers, they "must successfully challenge the factual findings upon
which the trial court's decision... depended." Chen v. Stewart, 2004
UT 82, n. 14 100 P.3d 1177. This requires that parties marshal the
evidence. As we have previously explained, parties who ask this
court to consider fact-sensitive questions- including those questions
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard- have a duty to marshal
all the evidence that formed the basis for the trial court's ruling.
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds,
2005 UT 35, 140 P.3d 1200, 1208-09.
Even where the defendants purport to challenge on ly the legal ruling,
as here, if a determination of the correctness of a court's application of
a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the defendants also have
a duty to marshal the evidence. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, % 20, 100
P. 3d 1177. Where an appellant fails to so marshal the evidence, we need
not consider the challenge to the sufficiency f the evidence. See Tanner v.
Carter, 2001 UT 18 ^[17,20 P.2d 332. Cache County v. Beus, 128
P.3d 63 (Utah App. 2005).
Therefore, if a party does not meet their marshaling requirement, then the appellate court
may presume that the findings were valid and affirm those findings. Then, once the appellate
court affirms the findings of fact, then they also may affirm the trial court's conclusion that arose
from those facts.
As is apparent from a comparison between Merae's "Statement of Facts" section above
and the selective "Statement of Facts" adduced by James in his brief, a number of important
pieces of evidence presented to the trial court and supportive of the trial court's findings were not
13

cited by James in his brief. Instead of presenting such supportive evidence and attempting to
demonstrate its insufficiency, James presented this appellate court with the selective version of
the facts that James thinks the trial court should have accepted at the trial. In other words, James
selected facts favorable to his theory of the consolidated cases, while wholly ignoring those facts
supportive of the findings of the trial court. Rather than properly marshaling the evidence as
required, James selectively presented facts favorable to his argument on appeal in a misplaced
and inappropriate effort to reargue the merits of his case before this appellate court. Because
James has failed in his basic threshold duty on appeal to properly marshal the evidence, the trial
court's findings on both cases consolidated on appeal must stand.
Additionally, James not only failed to cite certain material facts supportive of the findings
of the trial court, he goes a step further to actually misrepresent or skew the nature of certain facts
adduced in his brief. In analyzing James' arguments as contained in his brief, it should be noted
that a number of them are built on assumptions that he reached in his arguments before the trial
court, but which the trial court did not accept and in fact, are contradicted by testimony.
Some examples are:
1. In James' Fact No. 4, the claim is made that during their marriage, the parties enjoyed
and extravagant and luxurious lifestyle, and traveled all over the World and U.S. This statement
is misleading because it omits the following material facts:
A. Prior to March of 1995, when Merae sold her 1005 Shares, the parties had no
savings, no boat, drove high-mileage used cars, the checks to pay their monthly
14

house payment bounced on at least two occasions, and their checking account at
Bank One was frequently overdrawn and checks returned, see Tr-1295 L 24-25,
Tr 1296 L 1-25.
B. After Merae sold her 1005 Shares, the parties drove new automobiles,
purchased a 26 foot Sea Ray boat, became members of the University of Utah
Crimson Club, enjoying its associated benefits, and had savings accounts, treasury
bills, the Fidelity Account, and enjoyed, with their four children, cruises,
vacations, and sporting events wherever they were played, see Tr-i297-8.
2. It is represented at James' Fact No. 4, that the parties' "jet-set" lifestyle was funded, in
part, by James' salary and commissions. This statement is untrue because James did not earn
enough money to contribute to the parties' lifestyle, see Tr 1298 L 20-25.
A. James earned $2,391 in 1998, see Ex P1346.
B. James earned -$61 in 1999, see Ex P1350.
C. James earned $600 in 2000, see Ex P1354.
D. James earned $1,748 in 2001, see Ex P1358.
3. One other area where James misrepresents the facts by omitting to state material facts
related to the issue is set forth at Point II on page 36 of his Brief. James states that" he filed a
Rule 60 (b) motion.... because the findings of fact drafted by Merae's counsel, did not accurately
reflect the trial court's rulings". This statement fails to state facts material to the issue, which are:
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A. At the conclusion of the ruling hearing, the trial court directed Merae's counsel
to draft the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an amended decree of
divorce* reflecting the court's rulings.
B. The papers were prepared by Merae's counsel and hand-delivered to James'
counsel on September 6th, 2005.
C. James' counsel filed no timely objections to the papers under Rule 7 (f)(2) of
the U R Civ P, and on September 19th, 2005, the trial court signed the papers, on
September 20th, the clerk entered them, R 3726, and on September 21 st , the
amended decree of divorce was entered in the registry of judgments, R 3746.
D. On November 10th, 2005, James filed objections to the papers, see R 3882.
E. The only post-trial motion filed by James was the Rule 60 (b) motion submitted
on November 10th, 2005, claiming that the papers filed by Merae's counsel did not
accurately reflect the trial court's rulings, see R 3901.
F. Merae filed a timely response to James' motion asserting that James waived his
right to object to the papers filed by Merae's counsel because he did not file
timely objections as allowed by Rule 7 (f)(2) of the U R Civ P, see R 3923, and
that a Rule 60 (b) motion was an inappropriate means of objecting to the papers,
see R 3923.

* An amended decree was appropriate because a bifurcated decree of divorce was signed on
July 7th, 2003, see R 1171.
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G. The trial court denied James' Rule 60 (b) motion on February 21 st , 2006,
stating, in part, that the papers correctly capture the court's findings, see R 4063.
4. James' Brief at page 34 states that the trial court made no findings regarding the
$460,000 received from the sale of the Lori Kay Home. This statement is untrue and again
constitutes improper marshaling.
At the ruling hearing, the trial court found that the $460,000 ($406,142.55 net) was
Merae's sole and separate property and gave the following reasons for that finding, see Ruling
Hearing P 4 and 5.
A. The funds used to purchase and remodel the Lori Kay Home were Merae's.
B. When the Lori Kay Home was sold, the funds went back to Merae and every
action taken thereafter was that the funds were hers.
C. James made no objection that the funds be placed back into Merae's account.
D. James made no claim on the funds.
E. It appears that James assented to the fact that these were Merae's funds that had
purchased and remodeled the Lori Kay Home and that on sale, Merae was entitled
to the proceeds.
The Court's rulings relative to the $460,000 are set forth in the following findings, see R
3731 and 3732.
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40. During September of 1997, the parties purchased a home on Lori Kay Drive,
Holladay, Utah, the "Lori Kay Home" herein, and a vacant lot hereinafter referred
to as the "Odd Piece of the Lori Kay Property", for $379,964.67.
41. The entire purchase price was paid by the Respondent from funds in the
Fidelity Account.
42. The Lori Kay Home was remodeled and the entire cost of remodeling was
paid by the Respondent from funds in the Fidelity Account.
43. The Lori Kay Home was sold in October of 1998 for $406,142.55 after real
estate commissions and closing costs were paid.
44. The Odd Piece of the Lori Kay Property was not sold and, at the time of trial,
was held jointly by the parties.
45. The net proceeds of the sale of the Lori Kay Home were deposited in the
Fidelity Account and every action taken thereafter shows that the funds were the
Respondent's sole and separate property.
46. Petitioner made no objection that the funds received from the sale of the Lori
Kay Home be placed back into the Fidelity Account nor did he make a claim on
the said funds, in fact, he assented that it was the Respondent's funds that had
purchased and remodeled the Lori Kay Home and that, when the Lori Kay Home
was sold, Respondent was entitled to the proceeds.
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47. It is reasonable that the funds received from the sale of the Lori Kay Home,
$406,142.55, be the Respondent's sole and separate property.
5. Another example of misleading and inadequate marshaling is the representation in
James' Fact No. 17, that monthly payments of $25,335.15 received by Merae, from the sale of
her 1005 Shares, were deposited in the parities' joint bank accounts. This is a mis-statement of
the evidence. The true testimony and other evidence are:
A. The Fidelity Account statements show that the account was opened on
February 26*, 1996, see Ex P 2040-2047.
B. The statements show that Merae's Fidelity Account was an individual account,
not a joint account with James, see Ex P 2048-2059.
C. The Fidelity Account was opened to hold monies received by Merae from the
sale of her 1005 Shares, Tr 890 L 10-20
D. In June of 1995, Merae purchased $224,000 worth of treasury bills, in her
name only, from money she received from the sale of her 1005 Shares, see Ex P
1977-1980.
E. When the treasury bills matured, they were cashed by Merae and the cash
deposited by her in the Fidelity Account, see Tr 818 L 12-20 and Tr 819 L 14-22.
F. Under the Stock Purchase Agreement, Ex P 2453 at paragraph 6, Merae
received $25,335.15 each month.
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G. James testified that Merae received her monthly stock purchase payment
agreement near the latter part of the month. See Tr 853 L 14-16.
H. Merae's June 1996 payment was deposited in the parties' Bank One Account
and a check for $23,000 was written to the Fidelity Account and $2,335.15 was
left in the Bank One Account to pay bills, see Ex P 1627, Tr 851 L 23-25 and Tr
852 L 1-7.
I. Merae's November 1996 payment was deposited in the parties' Bank One
Account and a check for $21,000 was written to the Fidelity Account and
$4,335.15 was left in the Bank One Account to pay bills, see Ex P 1627, and Tr
853 L 8.
J. Merae's May 1996 payment of $25,335.15 was deposited in the parties' Bank
One Account and a check for $22,000 was written to the Fidelity Account, see Ex
P 1627 and Tr 853 L 10.
K. During January of 2002, James told Merae that he was earning good money
and was the top salesman at MESCO, earning enough to pay family necessities
and bills, see Tr 1514 L 16-17 and Tr 1515 L 13-24.
L. Merae's intent was to use the Fidelity Account money for the education of the
parties' four children and to provide cars, boats, trips, and recreation for the
family, see Tr 902 L 11 and Tr 1519 L 1-4.
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M. Merae payed off the mortgage on the parties' home at Village Point Way from
the Fidelity Account, see Tr 1284 L 11-18.
N. Merae payed $34,000 for a 26 foot Sea Ray boat from her Fidelity Account,
see the 6/4/99 entry on Ex R 10.
O. When the boat was demolished in an accident, the insurance company paid
$30,000 and that sum went into the Fidelity Account, see the 5/8/01 entry on
ExRll.
P. James told Merae that the purchase and remodel of the Lori Kay Home would
be a very profitable investment, see Tr 1534 L 12-18, Tr 1545 L 12-19, and Tr
1548 L 10-13.
Q. Merae purchased the Lori Kay Home by issuing a $379,964.67 check on her
Fidelity Account, see the 9/15/97 entry on Ex R 16.
R. All funds utilized to remodel the Lori Kay Home came from the Fidelity
Account, see Ex R 16 checks to Class One Construction.
S. When the Lori Kay Home was sold in October of 1998 for $460,000, the net
proceeds of $406,142.55 were deposited in the Fidelity Account, see 10/20/98
entry on Ex R 17.
T. James made no claim to any of the proceeds from the sale of the Lori Kay
Home, see Tr 704 L 1-3.
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U. Merae lost approximately $51,000 by purchasing, remodeling, and selling the
Lori Kay Home, see Ex R 16.
V. The Odd Piece of Lori Kay Property has questionable value because it is landlocked, cannot be re-zoned for commercial use, and may not be a legal building
lot, see Tr 558 L 19-25 and Tr 559 L 1-9.
W. Merae payed $28,570.94 for a 1997 Chevrolet Suburban from the Fidelity
Account, see 10/12/99 entry on Ex R 9.
X. From the funds she received from the sale of her 1005 Shares, Merae deposited
$2,507,873.99 in the Fidelity Account, see Ex R 15.
Y. At the time of the parties' separation, February of 2002, Merae had a balance
of approximately $1,055,000 in her Fidelity Account, see Ex P 2049.
6. Set forth in James' Brief at page 14, paragraph 6, is the statement that "during their
marriage, both parties freely signed each others names on checks from various accounts....both
had trading privileges on the parties' stock accounts." As support for these factual statements are
a Sandy Police Officer report, Ex P 2123; a $252 check written on April 22nd, 1994, Ex P 1625;
the testimony of Officer Brown at Tr 464 L 16-25 and Tr 465 L 722 and the testimony of James
at Tr 828 L 9-25.
Again, James is guilty of misleading marshaling and misrepresenting the evidence.
Officer Brown testified that Merae communicated to him that over $100,000 was missing from
her Fidelity Account. When Officer Brown discussed the matter with Greg Bown, Assistant
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District Attorney, Officer Brown stated that in the his family it was a common practice for a
husband and wife to sign each other's signatures, deposit checks. James testified that on April
22nd, 1994, a $252 check was made out and the signature "looks like Merae's", see Tr 828 L 925. The Sandy City Police Report, Ex P 2123 at Page 4 states that "the DA's office would not file
in this case, because it was too problematic. He indicated that it was common practice for
husbands and wives to sign each other's names and he believed the funds to be common property
within the marriage.... plus the account was in both parties names."
No reference is made in the exhibits or testimony related to the parties' stock trading
privileges.
The above examples of failed, incomplete, skewed, and/or misleading marshaling are by
no means exhaustive. The number and magnitude of such examples demonstrate that such
instances of failure on the part of James are neither incidental, inadvertent, nor harmless. Rather,
they are legion, they are material, and they are systematic. In short, they call into serious question
all of James' factual representations, both what has been included (including whether any given
factual representation is accurate or placed in proper context) and what has not been included.
D.

WHEN THE APPELLANT DOES NOT MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE, SHOULD
THE APPELLEE DO SO?
When the Appellant fails to meet the burden of marshaling the evidence, the Appellee is

on the horns of a dilemma, to use a well known phrase. Should the Appellee point out the
deficiency of the Appellant and close the brief or should the Appellee marshal the evidence to
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demonstrate and show the deficiencies of the Appellant's brief?. As an abundance of caution,
Merae, the Appellee in both of the consolidated cases, has decided to take the second position
and marshal the evidence on each point made on appeal by James.
1. James claims that the $2,500,000 received by Merae from the sale of her 1005 Shares
was not Merae's inheritance. The evidence on this point is
A. Merae's father, Frank Pardoe, founded Utah Bearing and Fabrication, Inc., see
Tr 1402 L 3-8.
B. Mr. Pardoe died in August of L993 Tr 1402 L 7 and 8.
C. Prior to his death, Mr. Pardoe gave interests in the business to his children, see
Tr 1402 L 9-25.
D. Mr. Pardoe gave Merae, who is one of his children, the 1005 Shares, see Tr
1403 L 16-25 and Ex P 2453.
E. In 1995, Merae wanted to sell her 1005 Shares, see Tr 1404 L 5-11.
F. On May 24th, 1995 the corporation agreed to pay Merae $2,500,000 for her
1005 Shares, see Ex P 2453, payable $500,000 as a down payment and a ten year
trust deed note, Ex P 2449 for $2,000,000 payable at the rate of $25,335.15 per
month.
G. The agreement, Ex P 2453, was signed by Merae, her brother Dirk Pardoe, then
president of the company, and Thomas KLC, Merae's attorney in the transaction.
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H. On June 9th, 1997, Merae received $1,697,039.88 as full payment of the
remaining balance owed under the Stock Purchase Agreement, see Ex P 2451.
2. James claims that the funds Merae received from the sale of her 1005 shares of Utah
Bearing lost their character by co-mingling and by the purchase of two parcels of property in
joint tenancy. The evidence on the co-mingling issue is
A. James testified that the "half million went into a joint money market for a
month", see Tr 804 L 6-7, and that "we depleted the money by buying U.S.
Treasury Bills", see Tr 804 L 8 and 9.
B. James produced no exhibit showing the existence of the half million dollar
joint money market account.
C. Exhibit P 1977 shows that a $100,000 treasury bill was purchased in Merae's
name only.
D. Merae testified that it was her intent to keep her inheritance for the childrens'
education, family entertainment, tennis lessons, and vacations, see Tr 902 L 11
and 12 and Tr 1519 L 1-4.
E. Merae testified that she understood from James that his earnings would be used
to pay monthly living expenses such as the mortgage, utilities, taxes, and things
like that, see Tr 1514 L 14-20, Tr 1515 L 20-24, and 1516-1517.
F. Merae wrote a $34,000 check from her Fidelity Account for a 26 foot SeaRay
boat and trailer, see Tr 1519 L 5-19 and the 6/4/99 entry, check 1126, on Ex R 10.
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G. Merae wrote a $28,570.94 check from her Fidelity Account for a 1977
Suburban automobile for use by the family and to pull the boat and trailer, see
10/12/99 entry on Ex R 9.
H. The boat and trailer were totaled in an accident and the insurance proceeds of
$30,000 were deposited in Merae's Fidelity Account, see Ex R 11, 5/8/01
transaction period.
L Merae wrote a $35,806.77 check from her Fidelity Account on 8/8/01 to
purchase a boat to replace the 26 foot Sea Rey that had been totaled, see Ex R 12.
J. After talking to James, Merae believed that insurance proceeds were sufficient
to purchase the Replacement Suburban, see Tr 1479 L 9-13.
K. James forged Merae's name on a $30,510.93 check on her Fidelity Account,
made payable to Larry H. Miller Chrysler/Jeep, to pay for the Replacement
Suburban, see last page of Ex R 14.
L. James told Merae that he was MESCO'S top salesman, see Tr 515 L 18 and 19.
M. Evidence produced by Merae showed that James did not earn sufficient money
at MESCO to pay any of the family's expenses, see Ex P 1346, P 1350, P 1354,
andP1358.
N, James testified that some of the payments made to Merae under the Stock
Purchase Agreement were deposited in the parties' joint bank account at Bank
One, see Tr 851 L 14-20.
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O. James wrote a check on the parties' joint account payable to Merae's
individual Fidelity Account for $10,000 on January 9th, 1996, see Ex P 2102.
P. James wrote a check on the parties' joint account payable to Merae's individual
Fidelity Account for $22,000 on May 23rd, 1996, see Ex P 2102.
Q. James wrote a check on the parties' joint account payable to Merae's
individual Fidelity Account for $23,000 on June 16*, 1996, see Ex P 2102.
R. James wrote a check on the parties' joint account payable to Merae's individual
Fidelity Account for $21,000 on November 25th, 1996, see Ex P 2103.
S. James wrote a check on the parties' joint account payable to Merae's individual
Fidelity Account for $18,000 on May 23rd, 1997, see Ex P 2103.
The evidence related to the two parcels of property in joint tenancy is
A. Merae wrote a check on September 15th, 1997, from her Fidelity Account for
the sum of $379,964.67 to buy the Lori Kay Home and Odd piece of Lori Kay
Property, see 9/15/07 transaction on Ex R 16.
B. Thereafter, Merae wrote checks for remodeling expenses for the Lori Kay
Home, see Ex R 16.
C. Merae did not feel good about putting that much money into the Lori Kay
Home, see Tr 1536 L 18-25, but James suggested that the home be purchased
using Merae's inheritance and after making a profit on the home, she would have
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more money to put into her inheritance, see Tr 1537 L 4-6 and 24-25 and Tr 1538
L 1 and 2.
D. The parties talked about getting a conventional loan to purchase the Lori Kay
Home and James told Merae that his parents would not give him an early
inheritance, but that he could qualify for a loan based on his earnings but knew
that Merae did not like paying interest, see Tr 1538 L 12-20.
E. James told Merae that the Odd Piece of the Lori Kay Property could be
purchased for $20,000, see Tr 1541-1542 L 1 and 2, and re-sold at a profit when
an easement was obtained, see Tr 1458 L 10-13.
F. James told Merae that she should be glad she used her inheritance to get the
Lori Kay Home because she would have more money to put back into her Fidelity
Account. See Tr 1548 L 1-3.
G. James told Merae that the Lori Kay Home could be sold for a profit and if the
back lot was divided, it could be sold for another profit. See Tr 1548 L 10-13.
H. From her Fidelity Account, on September 15*, 1997, Merae paid $457,146.18
to purchase and improve the Lori Kay Home, see Ex R 16.
I. On October 20*, 1998, the Lori Kay Home was sold for $406,142.55, net, and
that sum was deposited via wire transfer to Merae's Fidelity Account, see Ex
R17.
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J. James made no claim to any of the proceeds from the sale of the Lori Kay
Home.
3. James claims that there was insufficient evidence produced at the trial to show that the
parties' joint bank accounts were used as conduits for Merae's inheritance, not as repositories in
which they became co-mingled. The evidence on this issue is
A. The Fidelity Account was opened to hold monies received by Merae from the
sale of her 1005 Shares, see Tr 890 L 10-20.
B. In June of 1995, Merae purchased $224,000 worth of treasury bills, in her name
only, from money she received from the sale of her 1005 Shares, see Ex P 19771980.
C. When the treasury bills matured, they were cashed by Merae and the cash
deposited by her in the Fidelity Account, see Tr 818 L 12-20 and Tr 819 L 14-22.
D. Merae's June 1996 payment of $25,335.15 was deposited in the parties' Bank
One account and a check for $23,000 was written by James to the Fidelity
Account and $2,335.15 was left in the Bank One account to pay bills, see Ex.
P 1627, Tr 851 L 23-25, and Tr 852 L 1-7.
E. Merae's November 1996 payment was deposited in the parties' Bank One
Account and a check for $21,000 was written by James to the Fidelity Account
and $4,335.15 was left in the Bank One account to pay bills, see Ex. P 1627 and
Tr 853 L 8.
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F. Merae's May 1996 payment of $25,335.15 was deposited in the parties' Bank
One account and a check for $22,000 was written by James to the Fidelity
Account, see Ex. P 1627 and Tr 853 L 10.
G. From the funds she received from the sale of her 1005 Shares, Merae deposited
$2,507,873.99 in the Fidelity Account, see Ex R 15.
H. At the time of the parties' separation, February of 2002, Merae had a balance
of approximately $1,055,000 in her Fidelity Account, see Ex P 2049.

III.

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL AT
THE TRIAL OF THE DIVORCE CASE TO SHOW THAT JAMES USED THE
MONEY HE RECEIVED FROM FORGING AND ALTERING CHECKS FOR
FAMILY PURPOSES, BENEFITTING ALL MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY,
INCLUDING JAMES.
Because Merae claimed that James altered and forged checks on her Fidelity Account, she

had the burden of proving that fact by a preponderance of the evidence, see In re:Swans Estate,
293 P. 2d 682, 686 (Utah 1956). Merae sustained this burden by establishing a) that the Fidelity
Account was her individual account, see Ex P 2048-2059 b) that James altered checks by
changing the arabic number 1 to a 4, and writing an "F" in front of the written "One" on six
checks, see Ex R 13, and forged her signature on nineteen checks, see Ex R 14, c) that James had
no authority to alter checks signed by Merae and no authority to sign Merae's name to checks on
her Fidelity Account, see Tr 1510 L 1-3, d) that Merae was not aware that James had forged and
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altered checks on her Fidelity Account until after the parties' separated in February of 2002, see
Tr 1510 L 1-3, and e) James did not tell Merae what he did with the $142,647, see Tr 1512 L 1-4.
Based upon this evidence, the trial court ruled that James, without authorization, signed
Merae's name to checks and he, without authorization, altered the amount on certain checks, see
Ruling Hearing P 5 L 5-8.
With this ruling as a predicate, the trial court entered findings 72, 75, and 76, see R 3735
and R 3736, which are:
72. Petitioner, without authorization, forged Respondent's name on Fidelity
Account checks totaling $142,467 made payable to himself or cash that he
converted to cash.
75. Petitioner, without authorization, altered 6 checks given to him by the
Respondent by increasing them from $1,000 to $4,000.
76. The alterations reduced Respondent's balance in the Fidelity Account $18,000
more than Respondent intended when she wrote the checks and gave them to the
Petitioner.
James contended that he had the authority to write checks, alter checks, and forge
Merae's signature on the Fidelity Account, therefore, he had the burden at trial to prove these
facts, by a preponderance of the evidence.
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The trial court determined that James did not sustain his burden of proof, and that he
forged Merae's name without authorization and, as a result, entered findings 72-76, inclusive, see
R 3735 and 3736.
James contended at trial that the $142,467 he received by forging Merae's name and
altering checks was used by him "to pay family expenses." The burden of proof was upon James
to establish this fact by a preponderance of the evidence. In this regard, it was his burden to
prove that his evidence was more credible or entitled to the greater weight and if he failed to do
so, he did not sustain his burden of proof and this issue must be decided against him, see
Koeslinger v. Basamakis, 539 P. 2d 1043, 1046 (Utah 1975).
The only evidence James produced, in an effort to sustain his burden of proof, was his
testimony. His statements were not supported by a document, such as a receipt, journal entry,
cancelled check nor a witness, such as a piano teacher or a tennis instructor who could testify that
James paid in cash or by a check written on James' account or on Merae's and James' joint
checking account.
This lack of evidence supporting and corroborating his testimony is particularly fatal
because James' credibility as a witness was so badly damaged at the divorce trial by the
following evidence:
1. James misrepresented to Larry H. Miller Chrysler Jeep and Zions Bank his year 2000
income and failed to disclose collection actions and lawsuits pending against him, see Ex
R6.
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2. James misrepresented to Merae his years 1998,1999, 2000 and 2001 income, see Tr
1514 L 17.
3. At James' suggestion, in August and November of 1996, Merae took $55,000 from her
Fidelity Account and put it in a joint account with James at American Investment, "The
Jay Rice Account," see Ex R 18.
4. During February of 2002, James told Merae that there was $41,000 in the Jay Rice
Account, see Tr 1470 L 20-25, when in fact it had a zero balance, see Tr 385 L 18-20.
5. James, during the first part of 2002, asked Mr. Rice to stall Merae when she asked to
see the Jay Rice Account balance until James could replace the funds he took, see Tr 386
L 24-25 and Tr 387 L 1-18.
6. James did not replace the funds he took from the Jay Rice Account, see Tr 1299 L 2-4.
7. James told Merae that the purchase price of the Replacement Suburban, $30,510.93,
was paid by insurance proceeds, see Tr 1490 L 16-22.
8. James forged Merae's name on a $30,510.93 check on her Fidelity Account made
payable to Larry H. Miller Chrysler/Jeep to pay for the Replacement Suburban and it was
returned "signature no match," see last page of Ex R 14.
9. James did not tell Merae that he wrote a $30,510.93 check on her Fidelity Account, see
Tr 1386 L 17-25 and Tr 1395 L 1-5.
10. James did not inform Merae that he borrowed $12,555.95 from Zions Bank to
purchase the Replacement Suburban, see Tr 1499 L 13-16.
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11. James did not inform Merae that he wrote checks payable to Zions Bank to make
monthly payments on the Replacement Suburban loan by forging her name on her
Fidelity Account checks, see Tr 1510 L 1-3.
James' testimony, standing alone, is so slight and unconvincing that Merae's motion to
amend should have been granted. In ruling on a Rule 59 motion, the trial court should grant the
motion if it can be reasonably concluded that the evidence supporting a finding is so slight and
unconvincing as to make the finding unreasonable and unjust. See Rule 59 (a)(6) U R Civ P and
Sharp v. Williams, 915 P. 2d 495, 497 (Utah 1996).
IV.

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE DIVORCE
TRIAL TO SHOW THAT MERAE SHOULD BE HELD IN CONTEMPT OF
COURT.
At findings 100, 101 and 102, see R 3740, the trial court determined that Merae was in

contempt of court for failing to provide information to James about the children's activities,
removing the children from school, interfering with parent-time, etc.
There was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support these findings. Prior to the
commencement of the trial, the parties, after nearly three full days of intense negotiations,
entered into a stipulation and agreement relative to custody of the minor children and related
matters. In the trial court's order that memorialized the parties' agreement, R 3526, it is clearly
stated at paragraph 12 that all matters related to custody of the minor children and related matters
were settled and that the only issues reserved for trial were:
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A. The issue of the costs of Special Master are reserved, if no settlement of the
same.
B. The issue of costs concerning the custody evaluator, court appointed
evaluation, including the costs for any and all experts from both parties
concerning the custody portion of this matter are hereby reserved.
C. The issue of child support is reserved, if no settlement of the same.
In accord with the foregoing, James had the burden to show, by clear and convincing
evidence, 1) that the issue of contempt was reserved for trial, 2) that Merae knew of orders of the
court relative to child custody and parent-time matters, 3) that she had the ability to comply, and
4) willfully and knowingly refused to do so, none of which was proven by the clear and
convincing standard.
A reasonable interpretation of the order is that all issues pending between the parties
relating to custody, parent-time, and related matters were settled and the only issues reserved for
trial were those set forth in the order. Issues of contempt were not reserved, therefore, they were
settled, not to be considered by the trial court.
V.

JAMES' COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED UNDER RULE 11
(B)(3) U R CIV P.
During the divorce trial, a Larry H. Miller Group Automobile Loan Application, Ex R 6,

was received in evidence as a document kept in the normal course of business by the Larry H.
Miller Group.
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Ex R 6 was filled out by James, see Tr 1278 L 15-21. The document was signed by
James, on December 29, 2000, see Tr 1278 L 25 and Tr 1279 L 1-2. Testimony given by David
Ingles, a representative of the Larry H. Miller Group, was to the effect that Ex R 6 was completed
by James and submitted to the Larry H. Miller Group and Zions Bank in connection with his
request for a loan to purchase a 1997 Chevrolet Suburban, see Tr 1387 L 15-22 and Tr 1388 L 512. The last line of the "Applicant" section of Ex R 6, states that James' trade or occupation is
"sales" and his gross monthly income is "$60,000."
Section VIII "Credit Application", at page 13-14 of the memorandum signed by Wendy J.
Lems, attorney for James, on November 10th, 2005, R 3842-3, states that "At time of trial, the
Petitioner testified that the "per month" reference on his credit application meant "per year" and
such was a mere inadvertence." A thorough review of the trial transcript of the testimony of
James shows that he did not testify concerning the gross monthly income section of Ex R 6 nor
did he testify concerning any other information contained in said exhibit.
The only testimony given by James at the time Ex R 6 was introduced in evidence is
found at Tr 1278 L 4-24 that reads:
Q

Graduate from high school though?

A

Yes.

Q

You read and write the English language?

A

Yes.

Q

Did you take any math classes in college?
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A

I did.

Q

Tell the Court what math classes you took?

A

I took algebra.

Q

So you're familiar with simple math and higher math?

A

Yes, that's correct.

Q

And

I'm handing you what's been marked as Exhibit 6 and ask you if you can

identify that? Let me help you with it a little bit. Isn't that the loan application that
you filled out at Larry Miller when the check that you delivered to them for
$30,000 was returned by Fidelity because the signature didn't match?
A

I believe that's correct.

Q

As a matter of fact it bears your signature down at the bottom where it says
applicant's signature, correct?

A

Correct.

By executing the memorandum on November 10th, 2005, James' counsel certified, to the
best of her knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under
circumstances, that the factual contentions in the memorandum have evidentiary support. Merae
filed her motion for sanctions under Rule 11(b)(3) because there is no evidentiary support for the
factual contention that James testified that the "per month" reference on his credit application
meant "per year."
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Pursuant to Rule 11 (c)(1)(A) U R Civ P, Merae's motion for sanctions, with a supporting
memorandum, see R 3959-3964, describing the specific conduct alleged to violate subsection (b)
of Rule 11, was served upon James' counsel, but not filed with the Court. In response to the
motion, James' counsel reiterated that James had corrected Ex P 6 at trial, see R 3944-3950.
Twenty one days after service of the motion and because the challenged paper was not withdrawn
or appropriately corrected, Merae's motion for sanctions was filed with the trial court, see R
3966.
The trial court denied Merae's motion by the minute entry dated February 21 st , 2006, see
R 4063, stating that "Whether the petitioner intended to inflate his monthly or yearly income is
unclear and open to different views of the evidence on that point. Consequently, the petitioner's
representations about the evidence that take one view to the exclusion of the other is appropriate.
There does not appear to be an intention to mislead or misrepresent."
The trial court erred in denying Merae's motion for Rule 11 sanctions because the
evidence is clear and uncontroverted that James' counsel intentionally misrepresented a material
fact to mislead the trial court.
VI.

JAMES FAILED TO SUSTAIN HIS BURDEN OF PROOF IN BOTH THE
DIVORCE CASE AND THE FRAUD CASE
In the divorce case, James alleged that the funds received by Merae from the sale of the

1005 Shares was part of the marital estate because 1] they were received during the marriage and
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2] they were neither inheritance nor gift, see R 7, therefore, he had the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, these facts.
In the fraud case, Merae alleged that James forged and altered her Fidelity Account
checks, that his acts constituted fraud and that he was unjustly enriched by his conduct, see FR
17. In response, James denied the allegations of Merae's complaint and as affirmative defenses
thereto averred that 1] he was Merae's express, implied, or apparent agent in all financial matters
2] all monies in the Fidelity Account went to pay marital debts, Merae's excessive spending
habits and to support and care for the parties' children 3] none of the money in the Fidelity
Account was used for the sole purpose of benefitting James, see FR 248. In addition, James filed
a counterclaim that he did not pursue.
It is an elementary rule of law that the burden of proof on any point is upon the party
asserting it. Stated another way is, the burden of proof is on the one having the affirmative of the
issue. In Re: Swan's Estate, infra; In Re: Wright's Estate v. Wright, 228 P. 2d 911, 914 (Kansas
1951); Gibson v. Gibson, 340 P. 2d 190,191 (Oregon 1959).
"The Plaintiff must present evidence first, because it is the Plaintiff that must establish a
prime facie case, that if unchallenged, is sufficiently proved to justify the granting of relief."...
"At that point, the Defendant may either challenge the prima facie sufficiency of the Plaintiffs
case or go forward with the Defendant's evidence."... "In most civil cases, the party with the
burden of proof must prove the case by a preponderance of the evidence, which is a less rigorous
standard than the "clear and convincing" standard for some civil cases, such as fraud, or the
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standard for criminal cases of "beyond a reasonable doubt." David A. Thomas, Utah Civil
Practice §11.07[2][c] (LexisNexis 2003).
Discussing presumptions, In Re: Swan *s Estate cited above, the Utah Supreme Court
indicated "[ojrdinarily the burden of persuasion, as distinguished from the burden of making a
prima facie case from which the fact finder could reasonably find the issue in his favor, is on the
party whose claim for relief depends on the existence of such fact."
Applying the In Re: Swan's Estate case to the divorce case, James had the burden of
proof on each of his claims.
1. James claimed that funds received by Merae from the sale of her 1005 Shares is part of
the marital estate because 1) they were received during the marriage and 2) they are neither
inheritance nor gift, therefore, he has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,
these facts.
2. James claimed that Merae's funds lost their identity through commingling, therefore,
he has the burden of proving this fact, by a preponderance of the evidence, in order to prevail.
3. James claimed that the funds received by Merae from the sale of her 1005 Shares were
increased as a result of his efforts, therefore, he has the burden of proving this fact, by a
preponderance of the evidence, in order to prevail.
4. James contended that he had the authority to right checks and forge Merae's signature
on said checks on her Fidelity Account, therefore, he has the burden to prove this fact, by a
preponderance of the evidence, in order to prevail. On this issue as well as those set forth at
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paragraphs 1,2, and 3 above, James must prove that his evidence is more credible or entitled to the
greater weight and if he fails to do so, he has failed to sustain his burden of proof.
5. James contended that he was given the authority by Merae to alter six $1,000 checks
making them $4,000 checks, therefore, the burden of proof is upon him to establish this fact by a
preponderant of the evidence. In this regard also, he must prove that his evidence is more credible
or entitled to the greater weight and if he fails to do so, he has not sustained his burden of proof
and this issue must be decided against him.
In addition to the In Re: Swan's Estate case, there are other supreme court cases that are in
accord.
The proponent of a proposition has two burdens relative to his proof: to produce evidence
which proves or tends to prove the proposition asserted; and to persuade the trier of fact that his
evidence is more credible or entitled to the greater weight. Once the proponent has produced such
evidence, the burden of producing evidence disproving or tending to disprove the proposition
shifts to the opponent, and he must introduce such evidence as may be necessary to avoid the risk
of a directed verdict or a peremptory finding against him as to the existence of the proposition.
Koeslingv. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah 1975).
The party having the risk of non-persuasion is naturally the one upon whom first falls this
duty of going forward with the evidence. Upon meeting their duty of going forward with evidence
that all authorized stock had been issued before the issuance of plaintiffs' stock certificate,
plaintiffs made out a prima facie case. Thereupon, the burden, in the second meaning of the
43

phrase, shifted to the defendants, but the risk of non-persuasion, which never shifts, remained
with plaintiffs. Kartchner v. Home, 262 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah 1953).
Paragraph 1. A. through H. above that begins at page 24 of this Brief shows that James
failed to sustain his burden of proving that the $2,500,000 Merae received from the sale of her
1005 Shares was a marital asset.
The law applicable to the issue of what property is marital or separate requires the trial
court to characterize the property of the parties and donated or inherited property is generally
considered separate property. "In distributing property in divorce proceedings, trial courts are first
required to properly categorize the parties' property as marital or separate." Elman v. Elman, 2002
Utah App. 83, f 18,45 P.3d 176 (Utah App. 2002) citing Kelly v. Kelly, 2000 Utah App. 236, f
24,9 P. 3d 171. Generally, trial courts are also required to award premarital property, and
appreciation on that property, to the spouse who brought the property in to the marriage. Id.
"Inherited or donated property, as well as its appreciated value, is generally regarded as
separate from the marital estate and hence is left with the receiving spouse in a property division
incident to divorce." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 citing Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P. 2d
304,308 (Utah 1988).
Separate property does not become marital property unless the other spouse has
augmented, maintained, or protected the separate property. See Mackey v. Mackey, 202 Utah App.
349,2002 WL 3138774 [Unpublished opinion]. The facts of the divorce case show that James
altered checks on Merae's Fidelity Account and forged her signature on checks payable to him or
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to cash. By so doing, rather than augmenting Merae's Fidelity Account, he decreased it, rather
then maintaining, he manipulated it, and rather then protecting, he raided it.
Applying the law to the facts of the fraud case, it follows that because Merae alleged that
James altered and forged checks on her Fidelity Account and was unjustly enriched by his
conduct, she had the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence that this occurred. If
she failed to sustain her burden of proof, her complaint against James would be subject to a
motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50 (a) of the UR Civ P. If, however, Merae sustained her
burden, then James must produce evidence to show, by a preponderance of the evidence that he
did not forge or alter checks on Merae's Fidelity Account, he forged and altered Fidelity Account
checks with Merae's permission, that he acted as her agent, that the money obtained by forging
and altering Merae's checks was used for family purposes and not for the sole benefit of James.
Merae sustained her burden by producing the following evidence:
A. Merae testified that she gave FEx P 7 to James as $1,000 checks made payable to him,
see FTr 229 L 18-22.
B. Merae testified that when she gave FEx 1-7 to James, she intended to give him $1,000
for each check, see F Tr 229 L 18-25 and F Tr 230 L 1-6.
C. James testified that he received FEx P 1-7 from as $1,000 checks made payable to him
and that he changed the arabic 1 on each check to a 4 and wrote an "F" in front of the
"one" on each check and received $4,000 from each check, see Tr 1277 L 13-25.
D. James admitted, during his testimony on August 22nd, 2006, that he signed his then
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wife's name "Merae Kimball" to the following Fidelity Account checks made payable to
either "James Kimball" or "Cash" that were received in evidence during the fraud trial:
FEx P 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,23,24,25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33,41,45, and 46.
See FTr 61-90.
E. When pressed as to what he did with the $4,000 he received from FEx P 5, James stated
that "it possibly paid closing costs on Lori Kay Home," see F Tr 22 L 19-25.
F. FEx P 5 was given to James by Merae on January 29th, 2000.
G. The closing on the Lori Kay Home purchase was in September of 1997, see Ex 16, and
the closing on the Lori Kay sale was in October of 1998, see Ex 17.
H. Merae testified that prior to the date the parties separated in February of 2002, she had
no knowledge that James had signed her name on Fidelity Account checks or that he had
altered the $1,000 Fidelity Account checks she gave him, see F Tr 230 L 7-12 and F Tr
240 L 17-19.
I. Merae testified that she never gave James permission to sign her name on Fidelity
Account checks, see F Tr 240 L 17-19.
J. Merae testified that she never gave James permission to alter the Fidelity Account
checks she gave him, see F Tr 238 L 18-20.
K. After the parties' separation, in February of 2002, Merae became aware that James had
forged her signature on her Fidelity Account checks and had altered the $1,000 checks she
gave him, to be $4,000 checks, see F Tr 230 L 7-12.
46

L. Merae testified that she confronted James about the altered and forged checks on her
Fidelity Account and he refused to tell to her, see F Tr 240 L 24 and 25, F Tr 241 L 1
and 2.
M. The first time Merae knew that James was the person who had altered and forged her
Fidelity Account checks was on December 15th, 2004, when she heard him testify in the
divorce trial, see Tr 1277 L 13-25.
N. The first time she knew that James claimed he used the money he received from
altering and forging her Fidelity Account checks to pay family related expenses was on
December 15th, 2004 when she heard him testify at the divorce trial, see Tr 1276 L 3-11.
O. James testified on August 22nd, 2006 in the fraud case that he altered and forged checks
on Merae's Fidelity Account, see F Tr 16 L 19-21; F Tr 19 L 9-11; F Tr 29 L 1-11.
P. James testified on August 22nd, 2006 at the trial in the fraud case that:
1. He understood that he had authority to sign checks on Merae's Fidelity Account,
seeFTrl6L3-6.
2. He never signed a check on the Fidelity Account "James L. Kimball" or "James
Lewis Kimball", see F Tr 16 L 15-18, and on every check he signed on the account,
he signed Merae's name, see F Tr 19 L 19-21.
3. He altered the following checks to obtain $4,000 instead of $1,000:
a. FExP 5, seeFTr 18 L 11-25 andFTr 19.
b. Merae may have altered P 5, see F Tr 19 L 9-14.
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c. FEx P 1 - James "possibly" changed the 1 to a 4, see F Tr 29 L 4-5.
d. FEx P 2 - James "possibly" changed the 1 to a 4, see F Tr 32 L 5-7.
e. FEx P 3 - James testified that "I may have. Its possible" that he changed
theltoa4,seeFTr34L9-12.
f. FEx P 4 - James testified that he may have altered the check by stating
"may have; its possible" that he put the "F" in front of the "one" on the
second line of the check and changed the arabic 1 to a 4, see F Tr 36 L 1923.
g. FEx P 6- James testified that "its possible" that he altered the check, see
F Tr 38 L 22-25 and F Tr 39 L 1-8.
h. FEx P 7- James testified "I don't recall, but I may have" put a capital "F"
in front of the word "one" before receiving $4,000 for it, see F Tr 41 L 9-12
and L 18-25.
Q. As the foregoing paragraph 3. a. through h. shows, on August 22nd, 2006, when James
was asked about altering and forging Fidelity Account checks, his answers were peppered
with evasive answers such as "possibly", "I may have", "It's possible", and "I don't
recall", however, on December 15th, 2004 in the divorce case, James admitted altering
those checks, see Tr 1277 L 13-25.
R. James earned $600 in the year 2000, see FEx 640, and $1,748 in the year 2001, see FEx
641 and FTr 202.
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S. James considered the money in the Fidelity Account to be his money and Merae's
money, see F Tr 201 L 8-20.
T. During the year 2000, the Kimball family lived on the $600 James earned and the
Fidelity Account, see F Tr 201 L 21-25.
U. James did not tell Merae that he only earned $600 in the year 2000, see F Tr 204 L
20-25.
V. In the year 2001, James earned $1,748, F Tr 204 L 17-19, but did not divulge that fact
to Merae, see F Tr 204 L 20-25.
W. James did not tell Merae that he had changed the $1,000 checks she gave him to 4,000
checks, see F Tr 238 L 21-23.
X. Merae testified that she did not give James permission or authority to alter the checks
she gave him, see F Tr 238 L 15-20.
Merae presented her case-in-chief on August 22nd and 23rd, 2006. During those two days,
she produced testimony and exhibits showing that between October of 1999 and December of
2001, James altered and forged 24 checks on the Fidelity Account, payable to "Cash" or "James
Kimball" that totaled $54,800.
As part of Merae's presentation, James was asked if he had any evidence to show what he
did with the money he received from altering and forging Merae's Fidelity Account checks and he
stated the his evidence was in his lawyers' trial notebooks, see F Tr 28 L 1-7. The Court did not
allow James to go through the notebooks, while he was on the stand, to assemble his evidence, see
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FTr28L8-10.
To sustain his burden of proving that he used the money he received by altering and
forging Fidelity Account checks for family purposes, James presented checks that he wrote
between October of 1999 and December of 2001 on his Bank One account. The total of those
checks was $52,398.30 of which $44,587.19 were written to "Cash" or "James Kimball" see F Tr
181-183.
After considering the evidence, the trial court ruled that James had forged and altered
Merae's Fidelity Account checks that he was unjustly enriched thereby and that Merae was
entitled to a judgment in the sum of $54,800 plus pre and post judgment interest, see F Tr 502.
VII.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS PROPERLY AWARDED
Under Utah case law, prejudgment interest can be awarded if the loss is fixed at a definite

time and the interest can be calculated, see Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P. 2d 1206,1212
(Utah App. 1997). This case and others are discussed in the trial court's memorandum decision,
see F R 763.
VIII. THE DENIAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEE WAS PROPER
Both parties requested that the trial court award them costs and attorney's fees and in
considering their requests, the trial court analyzed the factors set forth at Utah Code Ann §78-2756 (Supp, 1988) which, applied to the divorce case, are:
1. Did the party prevail on the main issue of the case?
2. Were the fees sought reasonable?
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3. Did the party have a need?
In exercising its sound discretion, the trial court denied both parties' requests for their
attorney's fees and costs based upon the evidence presented at the divorce trial.
The trial court determined, as to James, that:
1. He did not prevail on the main issue of the case, see Ruling Hearing P 12 L 19-23.
2. The fees sought were not reasonable or necessary, see Ruling Hearing P 12 L 5-8.
3. James did not have a need because his fees were paid for him by his parents and he is
not legally bound to pay back his parents, see Ruling Hearing P 13 L 6-10.*
The trial court determined, as to Merae, that:
1. She prevailed on the main issue of the case, see Ruling Hearing P 13 L 11-12.
2. The fees she sought were unreasonable and unnecessary because this is a case that "got
out of hand." See Ruling Hearing P 12 L 12-14.
3. With the funds she was awarded, she does not have a need, see Ruling Hearing P 13 L
11-13.
4. James does not have the ability to pay Merae's costs and fees, see Ruling Hearing P 13
L 13-14.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasoning, analyses, and case law, Merae urges that this

* James failed to produce a promissory note or any other evidence of his obligation to his parents.
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appellate court enter a decision:
1. Allowing the trial court's findings in both the divorce case and the fraud case to stand
because James has failed in his basic threshold duty on appeal to properly marshal the evidence.
2. Granting Merae a judgment against James in the amount of $142,467 in the divorce case
or, in the alternative, upholding her judgment against James in the fraud case.*
3. Reversing the trial court order holding Merae in contempt of court.
4. Ruling that James' counsel violated Rule 11 of U R Civ P and remanding the issue to
the trial court for determining the appropriate sanction.
DATED this I f day of June, 2008.
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* Merae's prayer is in the alternative because she is not entitled to both judgments.
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